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Abstract—Cloud providers are concerned that Rowhammer poses
a potentially critical threat to their servers, yet today they lack a
systematic way to test whether the DRAM used in their servers is
vulnerable to Rowhammer attacks. This paper presents an end-
to-end methodology to determine if cloud servers are susceptible
to these attacks. With our methodology, a cloud provider can
construct worst-case testing conditions for DRAM.
We apply our methodology to three classes of servers from a
major cloud provider. Our findings show that none of the CPU
instruction sequences used in prior work to mount Rowhammer
attacks create worst-case DRAM testing conditions. To address
this limitation, we develop an instruction sequence that lever-
ages microarchitectural side-effects to “hammer” DRAM at a
near-optimal rate on modern Intel Skylake and Cascade Lake
platforms. We also design a DDR4 fault injector that can reverse
engineer row adjacency for any DDR4 DIMM. When applied to
our cloud provider’s DIMMs, we find that DRAM rows do not
always follow a linear map.
I. INTRODUCTION
The consequences of a large-scale security compromise of a
cloud provider cannot be overstated. An increasing number of
banks, hospitals, stores, factories, and universities depend upon
cloud resources for their day-to-day activities. Users store
important and private data in the cloud, including tax returns,
health records, e-mail, and backups. Home devices and home
automation are also becoming reliant on cloud infrastructure.
An attack that steals or deletes data, or performs a large-
scale denial of service (DoS) attack on the cloud, would be
catastrophic to both cloud providers and customers.
Today’s DRAM is vulnerable to memory disturbance errors:
a high rate of accesses to the same address in DRAM flips bits
in data stored in nearby addresses [69]. Rowhammer attacks
generate adversarial workloads that exploit disturbance errors
to flip the value of security-critical bits, such as an OS’s page
table entries [97], [32], a browser’s isolation sandbox [32],
a CPU’s isolation mechanism [59], an encryption key [97],
or a CPU instruction opcode [36]. Even worse, mounting
Rowhammer requires no special privilege: attacks have been
demonstrated by running user-level code [32], [97], JavaScript
programs [13], [37], and even by sending RDMA network
packets [106], [83]. Because all DRAM is potentially sus-
ceptible, Rowhammer attacks are an easy way to mount a
large-scale catastrophic attack on the cloud. The combination
of easy-to-mount and easy-to-scale makes Rowhammer a
formidable potential attack vector to the cloud.
Unfortunately, the threat that Rowhammer poses to cloud
providers remains unclear. Security researchers have been pub-
lishing a stream of proof-of-concept exploits using Rowham-
mer that affect all types of DRAM, including DDR3 [69], [32],
DDR4 [110], [77], and ECC-equipped DRAM [18]. DRAM
vendors claim that their memory is safe against Rowhammer
attacks; these claims are delivered to cloud providers with each
new DRAM feature: DDR4 [77], ECC-equipped DRAM [33],
[31], and TRR-equipped DRAM [81], [33]. There is a large
gap between a proof-of-concept exploit carried out in a re-
search lab and an actual attack in the wild. In fact, no evidence
indicates that Rowhammer attacks have been carried out in
practice. In the absence of attacks in the wild, one could easily
dismiss Rowhammer as a credible threat.
This confusion is further fed by the lack of a system-
atic methodology to test for Rowhammer. Previous proof-of-
concept attacks used varied methodologies to mount Rowham-
mer [69], [101], [32], [114], [13], [96], [11], [12], [37], [94],
[97], [110], [77], [59], [2], [35], [36], [105], [25], [106],
[83], [95], [16], [18], [10], [118], [22] based on heuristics,
without rigorously characterizing their effectiveness. While
such approaches can demonstrate an attack’s viability, they are
unsuitable for testing purposes because they cannot distinguish
between Rowhammer-safe memory and a sub-optimal, imper-
fect testing methodology. Lacking a comprehensive testing
tool, cloud providers find it difficult to ascertain the degree
to which Rowhammer poses a threat to their infrastructure.
Building a systematic and scalable testing methodology
must overcome two serious practical challenges. First, it
must devise a sequence of CPU instructions that leads to a
maximal rate of row activations in DRAM. This sequence
must overcome the hardware’s attempts to capture locality,
such as the CPU’s re-ordering of instructions and the DRAM
controller’s re-ordering of memory accesses. For this, we need
to measure the row activation rates of the instruction sequences
used by previous work, identify their bottlenecks, and test new
candidates that overcome these bottlenecks. Previous work
showed that the probability of flipping bits in a Rowhammer
attack increases with the rate of row activations [89], [69].
The second challenge is determining row adjacency in
a DRAM device. Contiguous virtual addresses do not map
linearly to DRAM rows and are in fact subject to three
mapping layers. The OS maintains a virtual-to-physical ad-
dress map that can change often and at runtime [55], [57];
if present, virtualization adds another mapping layer due
to guest-physical addresses. The memory controller further
maps physical addresses to logical bus addresses specified
in terms of ranks, banks, rows, and columns [72], [1]. The
final mapping is done by the DRAM device itself, where
a device can remap adjacent logical bus addresses to non-
adjacent physical rows [71]. DRAM vendors consider these
maps to be trade secrets and strongly guard their secrecy.
Prior techniques to reverse engineer row adjacency with
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a commodity memory controller rely on Rowhammer at-
tacks [100], [94], [105] and work only on DIMMs that
succumb to them. Once bits flip, the flips’ locations reveal
information on row adjacency. This creates a chicken-and-egg
problem: testing DIMMs’ resiliency to Rowhammer requires
knowing row adjacency information, and reverse engineering
row adjacency requires having DIMMs succumb to Rowham-
mer.
This paper presents solutions to both challenges and com-
bines them in an end-to-end methodology that creates worst-
case conditions for testing the presence of disturbance errors
in DRAM. Our methodology lets cloud providers construct (1)
an instruction sequence that maximizes the rate of DRAM row
activations on a given system, and (2) accurate maps of address
translations used by the system’s hardware. Armed with this
knowledge, a cloud provider can develop a quality control
pipeline to test its servers’ DRAM and ultimately characterize
the risk of a Rowhammer attack to its infrastructure.
We start by showing how a memory bus analyzer can char-
acterize the effectiveness of a sequence of CPU instructions
when hammering memory. It can measure the rate of activation
commands and compare them to the optimal rate (i.e., the
highest rate of activations to memory that the specifications
allow). Our results show that all instruction sequences used in
previous work hammer memory at a sub-optimal rate. Most
previous sequences have a rate that is at most half of optimal,
and the most effective previous sequence is 33% from optimal.
We tested 42 different instruction sequences, including those
found in previous work [69], [32], [114], [13], [96], [11],
[37], [94], [97], [110], [77], [59], [2], [35], [36], [105], and
developed additional variants.
Our characterization sheds light on the factors that prevent
these instruction sequences from having a high rate of ac-
tivations. One significant factor is out-of-order execution –
the CPU constantly re-orders memory accesses to increase
the likelihood they are served from the cache. Out-of-order
execution can act as a de facto rate limiter to Rowhammer
attacks. Equally significant are memory barriers. Some instruc-
tion sequences use memory barriers to order their memory
accesses. Although barriers do prevent out-of-order execution,
we find they are too slow. Instruction sequences that use
memory barriers lack the performance necessary to create a
high rate of activations.
This analysis led us to construct a near-optimal instruc-
tion sequence that maximizes the rate of activations, effec-
tively matching the minimum row cycle time of the DDR4
JEDEC [61] spec. Our instruction sequence differs consid-
erably from all sequences used in previous work because
it uses no explicit memory accesses (e.g., no load or store
instructions). Instead, we craft our instruction sequence to
leverage microarchitectural side-effects of clflushopt that is-
sues memory loads in order and without the use of memory
barriers.
We overcome our second challenge, determining row ad-
jacency, by designing and building a DDR4 fault-injector
that guarantees that any DIMM succumbs to a Rowhammer
attack. Our fault-injector is both low-cost and compatible with
any DDR4 motherboard. It suppresses all refresh commands
received by a DIMM for a fixed period of time. The absence
of refreshes ensures the success of a Rowhammer attack in
flipping bits on today’s DDR4 memory. The location and
density of bit flips lets our methodology reverse engineer the
physical row adjacency of any DDR4 DRAM device. To our
knowledge, ours is the first fault injector capable of injecting
faults into DDR4 commands.
We leverage the fault injector to reverse engineer physical
adjacency in a major cloud provider’s DRAM devices supplied
by three different vendors. Our results show that logical rows
do not always map linearly, but instead can follow a half-
row pattern, where two halves of a single row are adjacent to
different rows. A methodology that uses guess-based heuristics
to determine row adjacency will be ineffective in testing these
half-row patterns. We also find that mounting a Rowhammer
attack on a victim row that follows a half-row pattern requires
hammering more aggressor rows than it does for a victim row
that is contiguous within a single physical row.
We applied our methodology on a major cloud provider’s
three most recent classes of servers based on Intel’s Cascade
Lake, Skylake, and Broadwell architectures. On the two newest
architectures, Cascade Lake and Skylake, our methodology
achieves a near-optimal rate of activations by using clflushopt
to “hammer” memory, an instruction introduced with the
Skylake architecture. Finally, we used the fault injector to
successfully reverse engineer physical row adjacency on all
three classes of servers.
II. BACKGROUND
Rowhammer bit flips result from circuit-level charge leakage
mechanisms that are exacerbated by certain memory access
patterns. This section provides a high-level background on
DRAM and the physical mechanisms responsible for the
Rowhammer phenomenon in order to facilitate the understand-
ing of our work. More detail on Rowhammer and its system-
level implications can be found in [69], [88], [89].
A. DRAM Organization
DRAM comprises a hierarchy of two-dimensional arrays,
as shown in Figure 1. At the top level, a DRAM controller
interfaces with a DRAM rank over a channel (Figure 1a).
The channel conveys DRAM commands, addresses, and data
between the DRAM controller and the DRAM rank. In modern
systems, multiple DRAM ranks are typically combined in a
DRAM module (Figure 1b). The DRAM controller uses chip-
select signals to interface with only a single DRAM rank at
any given time.
A DRAM rank consists of multiple physical DRAM chips
(Figure 1c). The DRAM controller is unaware of how a single
rank is partitioned into individual DRAM chips. Instead, it sees
each rank as the union of multiple banks that are each striped
across the physical DRAM chips that form the rank. Thus, one
bank spans multiple DRAM chips, and a single DRAM chip
stores data from multiple banks. This has implications on how
failures affect banks. Different DRAM chips can have different
failure profiles depending on how they are manufactured; thus,
a “weak” DRAM chip affects multiple banks. However, only
a portion of each bank is affected, namely, the portion that
corresponds to the weak DRAM chip.
DRAM banks within a chip are further subdivided into
rows and columns of storage cells (Figure 1d), where each
cell encodes a single bit of data using the amount of charge
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Figure 1: Typical DRAM organization.
stored in a capacitor (i.e., data “1” as either fully-charged or
fully-discharged, and data “0” as its opposite). The DRAM
controller accesses a cell by specifying a row address and a
column address to a particular bank. It has no knowledge of
the physical layout of banks or that a bank comprises multiple
physical chips.
B. How DRAM Operates
A DRAM read operation senses the amount of charge
stored in cell capacitors. It is subdivided into three phases:
(1) Activation (ACT): the charge stored in an entire DRAM
row’s cells within a bank is sensed and stored in a row buffer.
The row buffer acts as a fast cache; subsequent accesses to
the same row do not require another activation. Instead, data
is read out of the row buffer. (2) Read (RD): the contents of
the row buffer at a given column address are returned to the
DRAM controller. (3) Precharge (PRE): the bank is prepared
for the next access by disconnecting and clearing the active
row buffer.
All rows in a bank share one row buffer. Within a bank, the
DRAM controller activates and reads from only one row at a
time. Write operations work similarly to reads.
Refresh (REF): DRAM cells leak their charge, which can
cause data loss when cells are not accessed frequently enough.
To prevent this, the DRAM controller issues periodic refresh
operations that replenish the cells’ charge. The DDR4 standard
specifies that 8192 refresh commands be issued during a 64
ms time period [61], which results in considerable power
consumption and performance overhead [85].
C. The Rowhammer Threat
Modern deeply-scaled DRAM devices are susceptible to
Rowhammer – a circuit-level disturbance phenomenon in
which repeatedly activating and precharging a given row
accelerates charge leakage in the storage cells of physically
nearby rows [69]. With enough activate/precharge cycles, this
phenomenon causes bit flips.
Prior work extensively studied the statistical characteristics
of Rowhammer-susceptible storage cells [69], [92], [77], [91]
and found that the magnitude of the error rate depends signif-
icantly on the number of activate/precharge cycles. Other fac-
tors affecting the error rates include the particular device under
test, the ambient temperature, and the data pattern written
into the cells. Recent work [115] identified the precise charge
leakage path responsible for Rowhammer errors and provided
a detailed model that explains experimental observations made
by previous work [92].
Proposals for mitigating and/or preventing Rowhammer
errors abound in both academia [5], [67], [102], [14], [56],
[104], [29], [111], [80], [15], [7], [6], [9], [8], [34], [74], [58],
[30], [63], [73], [99], [112] and industry [4], [39], [82], [24];
see [89] for a detailed survey of these works. However, while
DRAM manufacturers claim that modern DRAM devices are
resilient to Rowhammer bit-flips [81], [33], it is unclear
what causes this resilience and under what conditions the
Rowhammer-prevention mechanism may fail. Furthermore,
even if a particular DRAM device is supposedly protected,
there is no known way to verify that it is in fact fully resistant
to Rowhammer bit flips.
D. Intel-based Cloud Server Architectures
For the cloud market, Intel offers the scalable-performance
variant of Xeon processors (often referred to as Xeon-SP). SP
indicates a server class CPU for multi-socket cloud mother-
boards, introduced with Intel Skylake. Intel Broadwell uses
EP to designate multi-socket server CPUs.
We performed our experiments on the three most recent
generations of Xeon servers: Broadwell-EP, Skylake-SP, and
Cascade Lake-SP. Skylake is a major architectural revision of
Broadwell. Some of our results are affected by these archi-
tectural differences, such as whether the architecture supports
the clflushopt instruction. Cascade Lake is a minor revision of
Skylake, and, indeed, our results are similar on both of these
platforms. Intel announced the upcoming release of Ice Lake-
SP, a major architectural revision of Skylake, but these CPUs
are not available at this time.
III. CHALLENGES OF DRAM TESTING
Previous work established a direct relationship between the
number of DRAM row activations within back-to-back refresh
(REF) commands and the number of observed bit flips. A good
example is Figure 2 in a recent paper [89]. This observation
is not new; it goes back to the original paper showing
DRAM disturbance errors [69]. To test a DRAM row for its
susceptibility to Rowhammer attacks, we repeatedly activate
two adjacent rows co-located in the same bank. Alternating
accesses to two rows ensures that each access first precharges
the open row and then activates the row being accessed. We
refer to the rows we activate as aggressor rows, and the tested
row as the victim row.
Naively, to mount Rowhammer, one would like to activate
only a single row repeatedly. Unfortunately, there is no way
to accomplish this in practice on systems using an open-
page policy [65] (the terms page and row are equivalent in
this context). According to this policy, the memory controller
leaves a DRAM row open in the row buffer after access.
Accessing the same row leads to reading repeatedly from
the bank’s row buffer rather than to multiple row activations.
Open-page policy is the default configuration in most systems
today, including the servers used by our cloud provider.
A. Fundamental Testing Requirements
To identify all possible Rowhammer failures when a system
is operational, our testing methodology must replicate the
worst-case Rowhammer testing conditions. We identify two
fundamental testing requirements: (1) The methodology must
activate DRAM rows at the highest possible rate. Repeatedly
activating a row toggles the wordline’s voltage, which causes
disturbance errors. The testing methodology must toggle the
wordline voltage at the fastest (i.e., worst-case) rate possible
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to ensure the largest number of wordline activations within
a refresh interval. (2) The methodology must test each row
by identifying and toggling physically adjacent rows within
DRAM. Rowhammer attacks are most effective when aggres-
sor rows are physically adjacent to the victim row [69]. Ham-
mering rows without precise knowledge of physical adjacency
is not an effective testing methodology.
B. Challenges of Generating the Highest Rate of ACT Com-
mands
The initial study of DRAM disturbance errors [69] directly
attached DRAM modules to an FPGA board that acts as
the memory controller and can issue arbitrary DRAM com-
mands [38], [103]. The FPGA was programmed to issue ACT
commands at the optimal rate determined by the DRAM
timing parameter tRC (i.e., minimum row cycle time) in the
JEDEC specification sheet [60], [61].
In contrast, testing DRAM on a cloud server is challenging
due to the complexity of modern machines. Instruction se-
quences execute out-of-order, their memory accesses interact
with a complex cache hierarchy designed to capture and
exploit locality, and memory controllers implement complex
DRAM access scheduling algorithms [90], [109]. To com-
prehensively test a cloud server for Rowhammer-vulnerable
DRAM devices, we need to find the optimal instruction
sequence that, when executed, causes the memory controller
to issue ACT commands at the optimal rate (every tRC time
interval).
Previous work on Rowhammer used a variety of different
instruction sequences to mount the attack [69], [101], [32],
[114], [13], [96], [11], [12], [37], [94], [97], [110], [77],
[59], [2], [35], [36], [105], [25], [106], [83], [95], [16], [18],
[10], [118], [22]. It is unclear whether these sequences lead
to different rates of ACT commands, which sequence is the
most effective, and how far from the optimal ACT rate each
sequence is. Most previous work evaluated the effectiveness
of an instruction sequence mounting a Rowhammer attack via
the number of flipped bits metric. Unfortunately, this metric is
inadequate for testing DRAM because it fails to distinguish a
case where memory is safe from the case where the instruction
sequence is ineffective.
C. Challenges of Determining Adjacency of Rows Inside a
DRAM Device
Instruction sequences access memory via virtual addresses.
Virtual addresses are subject to at least three different remap-
pings until mapped to an internal set of cells inside a DRAM
device. Figure 2 shows the three different remapping layers.
1. Virtual-to-Physical: An OS maintains the map of vir-
tual to physical addresses. A virtual address gets translated
into a physical address by the CPU’s Memory Management
Unit (MMU). Virtualized cloud servers have an additional
mapping layer due to virtualization – virtual addresses are
first remapped to guest-physical addresses, which are then
remapped to host physical addresses.
2. Physical-to-Logical: A memory controller maintains a
map (or mapping function) of physical addresses to DDR
logical addresses (also called linear memory addresses [105])
and translates incoming physical addresses to DDR logical
addresses. These DDR addresses are specified in terms of
OS + Hypervisor
Workable
DRAM Internals
Trade secret 
DIMM-specific
DRAM Controller
Underspecified docs. 
Chipset-specific
Figure 2: Three remapping layers from virtual address to
DRAM internal address.
channel, DIMM, rank, bank, row, and column. These maps,
seldom public, differ from one CPU architecture to another,
and they are subject to various BIOS settings, such as inter-
leaved memory [70]. On Skylake [42] and Broadwell [41],
different memory controller configurations (e.g., page poli-
cies) [28] change these maps.
3. Logical-to-Internal: Vendors remap logical addresses in
order to decrease the complexity of internal circuitry and
PCB traces because some maps are electrically easier to build
than others [84], [78], [66]. Remapping also lets vendors take
advantage of the fact that DRAM devices have redundancy
to tolerate a small number of faults per chip; vendors test
for these faulty elements post packaging and remap wordlines
or bitlines to redundant ones elsewhere in the array (i.e., post
package repair) [26], [84]. Memory vendors regard these maps
as trade secrets.
Previous work used a combination of side-channel attacks,
reduced timing parameters, thermal heaters, physical probing,
and Rowhammer attacks to reverse engineer parts of these
maps [100], [94], [78], [64], [105]. Unfortunately, such tech-
niques have shortcomings that prevent our methodology from
using them. They are either too coarse-grained [100], [94],
[78], [64], invasive (i.e., potentially damaging the chips) [64],
inconsistent [100], [94], [105], or they do not capture DRAM
internal addresses [100], [94].
Side-channel attacks are coarse-grained. All memory ac-
cesses to a DRAM bank share one row buffer. Prior work
measured two addresses’ access times to determine whether
they are co-located in the same bank [100], [94]. Sequentially
accessing any two rows within the same bank takes longer than
accessing two rows located in different banks. However, this
method cannot provide finer-grained adjacency information.
The time spent accessing two rows sequentially in the same
bank is unrelated to the rows’ locations within the bank.
Reduced timing parameters is coarse-grained. Another
technique uses the distance from a row to the bank’s row
buffer [78], [68]. This technique induces errors by accessing
memory using shorter-than-normal DDR timing values. Data
stored in a cell closer to the row buffer has a shorter distance
to travel than data stored further away [79], and thus, it has
a lower likelihood to fail. This technique provides coarse-
grained and approximate row adjacency information only.
Adjacent rows have a negligible difference in access times,
and detecting such small differences is challenging.
Using heaters is invasive and coarse-grained. Another
technique surrounds a DIMM with resistive heaters, applies
a thermal gradient on each DRAM device, and conducts a
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Side-channels Reduced timings Heaters Physical probing Rowhammer attacks
[100], [94] [78], [68] [64] [100], [94] [100], [94], [105]
Fine-grained $ $ $ " "
Non-invasive " " $ " "
Finds Internal DRAM addresses " " " $ "
Consistent " " " " $
Table I: Limitations of previous work on reverse engineering row adjacency inside DRAM.
retention error analysis [64]. This approach requires high tem-
peratures, in excess of 99◦C. Cloud providers are reluctant to
adopt a testing methodology that heats up their hardware. Also,
the thermal gradient approach is coarse-grained; it can only
determine neighborhood relations rather than row adjacency.
Physical probing does not capture DRAM internal ad-
dresses. Another approach uses an oscilloscope probe to
capture a DDR electrical signal while issuing memory ac-
cesses [100], [94]. This approach cannot reverse engineer
how DDR logical addresses map to DRAM internal addresses
(Figure 2). Previous work used this technique to reverse
engineer only bank addresses [100], [94]. Reverse engineer-
ing row addresses would incur significant additional effort
for two reasons. First, row addresses require 22 individual
probes, whereas bank addresses require only 4 probes. Second,
the signals encoding row addresses change from one DDR4
command to another (Table II). The reverse engineering effort
would need to ensure that the probes capture only the signals
encoding DDR4 row activation, and not other commands.
In contrast, signals encoding bank addresses are shared by
DDR4 row activation, read, write, and precharge commands.
Capturing the signals corresponding to any one of these DDR4
commands reveals the bank address.
Rowhammer attacks are not consistent because they may
not cause failures. Another technique mounts Rowhammer at-
tacks on every row in DRAM and correlates each row’s density
of bit flips with adjacency [100], [94], [105]. Generating a high
rate of activations is enough to cause many bit flips on some
DIMMs, but not on all. This approach is unsuitable for testing
memory resilient to Rowhammer. This is an instance of a
chicken-and-egg problem: (1) testing DRAM for Rowhammer
susceptibility requires knowing the adjacency of rows inside
DRAM devices, and (2) deducing row adjacency requires
flipping bits using Rowhammer attacks.
Table I summarizes the limitations of previous work on
reverse engineering row adjacency inside DRAM.
IV. STEP 1: GENERATING THE HIGHEST RATE OF ACT
COMMANDS ON A SERVER ARCHITECTURE
We first describe the system setup we used to measure the
rate of row activations of an instruction sequence. Measuring
ACT rates lets us (1) find which instruction sequence generates
the highest ACT rate on a particular server platform, and (2)
quantify the difference between this highest ACT rate and
the optimal rate determined from DRAM datasheets [61]. We
then evaluate the performance of instruction sequences used by
prior work to mount Rowhammer. Finally, we present a new
instruction sequence that generates near-optimal row activation
rates on Intel Skylake and Cascade Lake architectures.
A. System Setup for Measuring ACT Rates
To determine the instruction sequence that generates the
highest rate of ACT commands, we used the FS2800 DDR De-
tective from FuturePlus Systems with two DIMM interposers
for DDR3 and DDR4 [27]. This system can monitor, capture,
and measure DDR commands issued over the command bus
to the DIMM using a DDR interposer and an FPGA that
triggers on specific DDR commands or memory addresses.
Once triggered, the FPGA records all DDR commands it
observes on the bus and stores them in buffers, which are
later transferred to a host computer over USB.
The traces gathered with the bus analyzer provide ground
truth information about the rate of activations of a DRAM row
and the memory controller’s behavior, including the logical
addresses used to access DRAM. We use these traces to
characterize the ACT rates of different Rowhammer instruction
sequences from previous work and to construct a sequence that
has a near-optimal ACT rate on Skylake and Cascade Lake.
We found it difficult to use a high-level OS (e.g., Linux)
for our methodology for two reasons: (1) an OS introduces
complex virtual-to-physical address mappings that can change
dynamically, and (2) an OS’s services introduce interfering
traffic to a DIMM when testing.
Instead, our methodology boots the computer into the UEFI
mode [107]. In this mode, the virtual-to-physical address
map is linear and does not change across reboots. UEFI’s
simplicity and lack of OS services eliminate any interfering
DDR traffic from our traces. However, it also increases the
amount of engineering effort required to implement our testing
methodology because UEFI lacks many services commonly
found in a commodity OS. Therefore, we had to implement
support for multi-threading, hardware discovery [108], [19]
and performance counters.
B. Performance Evaluation of Prior Instruction Sequences
Our results are based on experiments with six server-class
DIMMs that one cloud provider sourced from three different
memory vendors, two DIMMs per vendor. In alphabetical or-
der, these vendors are: Hynix, Micron, and Samsung. Although
sourced from different vendors, the DIMMs’ specs are similar;
they are registered ECC 32GB DDR4 (x4); the DIMMs from
two of the vendors have transfer rates of 2400 MT/s; and the
third vendor’s DIMMs have rates of 2666 MT/s. We found
negligible differences in the performance of an instruction
sequence from one DIMM to another. For consistency, the
results presented in this section use the same DIMM. One of
the timing parameters in the JEDEC specification is row cycle
time (tRC) – the minimum period of time between two back-
to-back ACT commands. The JEDEC specification lists tables
of minimum and maximum tRC values for different types
of DDR4 memory; these values depend on many memory
characteristics, such as speed, clock cycle, capacity, and so
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loop:
movzx rax, BYTE PTR [rcx]
movzx rax, BYTE PTR [rdx]
clflush BYTE PTR [rcx]
clflush BYTE PTR [rdx]
mfence
jmp loop
Figure 3: Typical Rowhammer instruction sequence.
on. Based on our DDR4 memory’s characteristics, the JEDEC
specification lists the minimum value of tRC as 47ns and does
not specify a maximum value (see Table 110 in [61]).
We measured tRC to be 46.7ns on all our hardware, cor-
responding to a rate of 167.4 ACT commands between two
consecutive REF commands issued by the memory controller
(i.e., one tREFI interval in JEDEC terminology). We call
46.7ns the optimal latency between two ACT commands,
and 167.4 ACTs/tREFI the optimal rate. All results presented
are based on experiments running on Skylake, although we
ran many of these experiments on Broadwell and Cascade
Lake with similar results. All servers use motherboards with
multiple CPU sockets.
Previous work used a variety of different instruction se-
quences in a loop to test for Rowhammer [69], [32], [114],
[13], [96], [11], [37], [94], [97], [110], [77], [59], [2], [35],
[36], [105]. Some of these sequences use memory barriers
to serialize the memory accesses on each iteration of the
loop [69], [114], [96], [59], whereas others do not [32],
[114], [11], [94], [37], [110], [2], [105]. To bypass the cache
hierarchy, some instruction sequences use an explicit CPU
flush instruction (e.g., clflush), but not all do. Some use cache
collisions to flush the cache [83]; others hypothesize that non-
temporal load instructions [44] could bypass the cache [110],
[35]. Another strategy we encountered was choosing a pair
of rows to hammer from a memory region marked as un-
cached [35]. Finally, the x86-64 architecture offers additional
instructions for cache invalidation, such as invd [45] and
wbinvd [46].
The pseudo-code in Figure 3 describes a typical sequence
that issues two load instructions, two clflush instructions, and
a global memory barrier, all in one loop. Several papers on
Rowhammer [69], [114], [96], including the original Rowham-
mer work [69], used this sequence.
Faced with all these choices of possible instruction se-
quences, we considered two questions: (1) Which prior in-
struction sequence maximizes the rate of ACT commands? (2)
How far from the optimal rate of ACT commands is the best
instruction sequence?
To answer these questions, we constructed 42 different
instruction sequences that let us experiment with:
• All three types of fences available on x86-64 architectures:
mfence [47], lfence [48], and sfence [49].
• Both clflush and clflushopt [50] commands (the latter is
an optimized cache flushing command with weaker ordering
semantics than the former).
• Marking as uncacheable the hammered memory pages’
PTEs, which eliminates the need to issue any CPU flush
commands.
• Both regular and non-temporal [44] memory accesses.
• Using the invd [45] and wbinvd [46] commands to invalidate
CPU caches.
• Using a cache invalidation scheme based on cache line
conflicts, similar to the one used by Nethammer [83] and
ANVIL [5].
Figure 4 shows the performance of four typical instruc-
tion sequences used in many previous Rowhammer attack
papers [69], [32], [114], [11], [94], [37], [110], [96], [2],
[105]. These four sequences are identical except for the type of
memory barrier they use to serialize the reads and flushes on
each loop iteration. The assembly code is shown to the right
of the graphs; the four sequences use mfence [47], lfence [48],
sfence [49], and no fence at all, respectively.
Figure 4a shows the CDF of the rate of row activations for
each sequence as well as the optimal rate (with a dashed line).
Despite the popularity of these instruction sequences, which
were used by previous papers to mount Rowhammer attacks,
we discovered that they do not create worst-case ACT rates
– their rates of row activations are 47% from optimal. Even
worse, using mfence, a sequence used by [69], [114], [96],
leads to the slowest ACT rate of the four sequences. The most
effective sequences impose no ordering and use no fences or
only store fences (sfence). A store fence has no ordering effect
because no sequences issue any stores.
Figure 4b shows the CDF of the latencies between two
consecutive row activations for each instruction sequence.
Although the sequence using mfence has the slowest ACT
rate, half of its latencies are optimal. We examined its behavior
closely and found that the two reads inside the loop are always
issued back-to-back at the optimal latency (46.7ns). However,
the next ACT command is issued after a long delay of over
220ns, which is caused by the mfence. The delay explains why
this sequence has a low rate of ACT commands This bimodal
delay between ACTs is clearly visible in Figure 4b.
These results illustrate the gap between a proof-of-concept
Rowhammer attack and the needs of a DRAM testing method-
ology. Although the instruction sequences shown in Figure 4
have been used in many papers to mount various successful
Rowhammer attacks, their ACT rates are far from optimal.
This suggests that the DIMMs found vulnerable in previous
work succumbed even to a low-rate Rowhammer attack. A
DRAM testing methodology based on these instruction se-
quences falls short of creating the worst-case testing condi-
tions for DRAM, which is necessary to confidently determine
whether a chip is vulnerable to Rowhammer.
Using clflushopt improves ACT rates. With Skylake, Intel
introduced an optimized version of the cache flush instruction,
called clflushopt, that has weaker ordering requirements than
clflush [50], [54]. Multiple clflushopt instructions to different
cache lines can execute in parallel. We performed a detailed
analysis by implementing support for performance counters
in UEFI mode [107]. We found that using clflushopt in our
instruction sequences takes only 3 micro-ops, whereas clflush
takes 4.
Figure 5 shows the three instruction sequences using mem-
ory barriers that have similar ACT rates; some have slightly
higher rates (the ones using sfence and lfence), whereas others
have slightly lower rates (the one using mfence). Although it
is difficult to quantify how different types of barriers affect the
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movzx rax, BYTE PTR [rcx]
movzx rax, BYTE PTR [rdx]
clflush BYTE PTR [rcx]
clflush BYTE PTR [rdx]
fence {m|l|s|no}
mfence lfence sfence no-fence
Figure 4: Performance of typical Rowhammer instruction sequences found in [69], [32], [114], [11], [94], [37], [110], [96],
[2], [105]. The left graph shows the CDF of the rate of ACT commands per tREFI; the right graph shows the CDF of the
ACT-to-ACT latencies. The dotted black line corresponds to the optimal rate of ACT commands.
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movzx rax, BYTE PTR [rcx]
movzx rax, BYTE PTR [rdx]
clflushopt BYTE PTR [rcx]
clflushopt BYTE PTR [rdx]
fence {m|l|s|no}
mfence lfence sfence no-fence
Figure 5: Performance of the same Rowhammer instruction sequences when using clflushopt (rather than clflush).
performance of the two cache line flush instructions, the high-
level finding remains the same: memory barriers are slow, and
instruction sequences using barriers have low ACT rates.
In contrast, the sequence that uses no memory barriers has
a much higher rate of ACT commands of 112 every tREFI,
corresponding to 33% from optimal. The lack of a memory
barrier causes this instruction sequence to have the highest
ACT rate overall. This finding is not intuitive – the lack of
memory barriers makes the CPU re-order memory accesses
to increase the likelihood that they will be served from the
cache. We measured this sequence and found its cache hit
rate to be 33% (in contrast, the sequence using mfence has
a 0% cache hit rate). Despite the CPU cache acting as a de
facto rate limiter to Rowhammer attacks, the ACT rate of this
instruction sequence is higher than those using any type of
barrier.
Uncached PTEs. We experimented with an instruction se-
quence that does not issue cache flushes, but instead marks its
memory pages uncacheable. The sequence has a low rate of
ACT commands.
Figure 6 shows the performance of an instruction sequence
that does not issue cache flushes, but instead marks its memory
pages uncacheable. Such a sequence has a low rate of ACT
commands, and also a very regular behavior: its ACT-to-ACT
latencies are almost always 110ns apart (in a small fraction
of cases, this latency increases because the ACT is blocked
behind an ongoing refresh command). These results suggest
that loading an address from uncached memory has a fixed
high cost, making this instruction sequence have a low rate of
ACT commands.
Non-temporal memory accesses. Intel offers five non-
temporal store instructions for different data types (e.g., inte-
gers, doublewords, floating point, etc.) and one load instruction
for double quadwords. These instructions do not follow normal
cache-coherence rules and fetch their corresponding cache line
from DRAM.
While experimenting with non-temporal instructions, we
discovered that accesses are cached, and not served by DRAM.
According to Intel’s documentation, these accesses use a form
of temporary internal buffers that might prevent them from
accessing DRAM, which can explain our findings.
We also experimented with instruction sequences that com-
bine non-temporal and regular memory accesses. We expected
that the different caching semantics of these two types of mem-
ory accesses would flush the caches (or internal buffers) in
each loop iteration. Previous work also proposed mixing these
two types of memory accesses for mounting Rowhammer [35].
We found these instruction sequences to be ineffective. Fig-
ure 7 shows the performance of one such instruction sequence
to be far from optimal (67% from optimal).
Full cache invalidations, cache collisions, loads vs. stores.
We experimented with replacing the cache line flush instruc-
tions with full cache invalidation instructions: invd [45] and
wbinvd [46]. We found that full cache invalidation instructions
are very expensive, making the instruction sequences have
low ACT rates. We also experimented with generating cache
conflicts to evict cache lines, but did not find higher ACT
rates. Finally, we experimented with replacing loads with
stores in various instruction sequences and found negligible
performance differences. For brevity, we omit showing these
results.
Differences across memory vendors. While all results shown
use DRAM from one single vendor, we performed these
experiments on DRAM from all three vendors. When using the
same instruction sequence, we found no significant differences
in the ACT rates when using DRAM from different vendors.
Key Takeaways
• All previously proposed instruction sequences are sub-
optimal for two reasons: (1) memory barriers are expensive
and thus reduce the ACT rate, and (2) in the absence of
memory barriers, the CPU re-orders memory accesses to
increase the cache hit rate and avoid accessing DRAM.
• Using uncached PTEs or non-temporal instructions is in-
effective, leading to negligible changes to ACT rates when
compared to the more common Rowhammer instruction se-
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Figure 6: Performance of the Rowhammer instruction sequence that marks its memory pages uncacheable.
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mov QWORD PTR[r9], rax
Figure 7: Performance of Rowhammer instruction sequence that uses a mix of non-temporal and regular memory accesses [35].
quences.
• The most effective instruction sequence proposed in previous
works uses two load, two clflushopt instructions, and no
memory barriers at 33% from the optimal rate (Figure 5).
C. clflushopt Alone Hammers Near-Optimally on Skylake and
Cascade Lake
To increase the rate of ACT commands, we experimented
with new instruction sequences that (1) do not use memory
barriers, and (2) are less prone to the effects of out-of-order
execution. Our experiments revealed that a cache line flush
instruction results in a memory access.
Figure 8 characterizes the rate of ACT commands of a
sequence consisting of two clflushopt instructions in a loop;
(these results are from our experiments on the Skylake-based
server, but they are very similar to those performed on Cascade
Lake). Figure 8b shows that over 87% of ACTs are issued at
the optimal rate, about 46.7ns apart from one another. The
remaining 13% are separated by an additional 10-20ns due
to conflicts with ongoing refresh commands (REF). When the
memory controller issues a REF, the bank remains inaccessible
until the REF finishes [17], and any ongoing ACT is blocked
waiting for the REF to finish. The REF-induced delay causes
this instruction sequence to issue 159 row activations for every
tREFI, a rate we call near-optimal.
The microarchitectural side-effects of clflushopt causes this
instruction sequence to issue row activations at a rate that
is 44% higher than the best previously known Rowhammer
sequence (159 vs 110 ACTs/tREFI). It is unlikely another
sequence could improve this rate because row activations will
still conflict with REFs that block the bank. Two clflushopt
instructions in a loop thus create the worst-case DRAM
“hammering” conditions on Skylake and Cascade Lake.
Why does clflushopt cause memory accesses? This in-
struction sequence is highly surprising in the context of
a Rowhammer attack because it uses no explicit memory
accesses. Instead, the memory access (a DDR4 read operation)
is a microarchitectural side-effect of the CPU executing a
cache line flush. It occurs only when the cache line is invalid.
Issuing a cache line flush instruction to a line present in the
cache does not cause any DDR read operations.
Our instruction sequence (Figure 8) causes two memory
accesses for each loop iteration except for the first iteration.
The first loop iteration does not generate memory accesses
when the lines are in the cache. However, it invalidates the
cache lines, causing all subsequent iterations to generate two
memory accesses.
According to Intel’s specification [52], [86], systems with
multiple processors may maintain cache coherence state of
each cache line within the line itself in memory. When
executing clflushopt on an invalid cache line, the processor
reads cache directory state from DRAM to determine whether
the line is present in other processors’ caches. We verified
clflushopt’s behavior on both Cascade Lake and Skylake. We
also show that clflush behaves similarly on both Cascade
Lake and Skylake, but on Broadwell clflush results in no
memory accesses. We hypothesize that clflush has more system
overhead than clflushopt because it is subject to additional
ordering constraints [51], leading to a reduced rate of DRAM
row activations. Figure 9 shows the performance of a sequence
using two clflush instructions in a loop; it activates rows at a
rate of 110 every tREFI, corresponding to 65.7% of optimal.
V. STEP 2: REVERSE ENGINEERING ROW ADJACENCY IN
ANY DRAM DEVICE
No technique used in previous work is suitable for reverse
engineering row adjacency: some are not fine-grained and can-
not determine adjacency at the level of an individual row [100],
[94], [78], [64], whereas others do not capture addresses
internal to DRAM devices and thus can determine adjacency
only in the DDR4 bus address space [100], [94]. The single
previous technique that can overcome these limitations works
only if the device succumbs to Rowhammer attacks [100],
[94], [105]. Section III-C describes these techniques and their
trade-offs in depth.
In an attempt to guarantee Rowhammer failures on our
DRAM devices, we experimented with lowering the refresh
rates of our servers. A low refresh rate ensures that an
attack sends a higher number of ACT commands to a victim
row before the row can refresh. This increases the attack’s
likelihood of success. Unfortunately, our experiments were
unsuccessful. Recent hardware makes it increasingly difficult
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Figure 8: Performance of the near-optimal Rowhammer instruction sequence using only clflushopt.
0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200
(a) #ACTs/tREFI
0.0
0.5
1.0
C
D
F 34% o
pt
im
al
0 50 100 150 200 250
(b) ACT-to-ACT Latency (ns)
op
tim
al
clflush BYTE PTR [rcx]
clflush BYTE PTR [rdx]
Figure 9: Performance of the Rowhammer instruction sequence using only clflush instructions.
Figure 10: Fault injector. When pressed, the button drives A14
to low. Two DIP switches form a 3-way switch to flip the
ALERTn signal. The third DIP switch is a spare.
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S
DIMM_ALERTn
CPU_ALERTn
DIMM_A14 CPU_A14
GND
FI_ENABLE
ALERTn_SUPPRESS
Figure 11: Fault injector schematic.
to set the refresh rates sufficiently low to successfully mount
a Rowhammer attack. Older generation BIOSes running on
DDR3-equipped hardware can set refresh rates up to 12x
lower than normal; such low refresh rates make DDR3 devices
succumb to Rowhammer attacks.
Modern BIOSes for DDR4 hardware restrict lowering the
rate to only ∼3.5x. Unfortunately, this refresh rate is not
sufficiently low to guarantee Rowhammer failures on our
servers. We also confirmed this is not a GUI restriction: we
examined the BIOS source code and found that the refresh
interval configuration register cannot hold a value larger than
one corresponding to a refresh rate of 3.5x lower.
A. DDR4 Fault Injector
Because modern BIOSes restrict lowering the DRAM re-
fresh rate, we used a different approach: we designed a DDR4
fault injector that blocks REFs sent by a memory controller to
an individual DIMM. Our fault injector manipulates electrical
signals and drives them from low to high, and vice-versa. Ma-
nipulating the DDR bus’s electrical signals effectively changes
one DDR command into another. This insight was inspired
by previous work that used a custom-made shunt probe to
induce faults in DRAM data and thus reverse engineered the
Table II: DDR4 command encoding [113].
DRAM controller’s ECC scheme [18]. Figure 10 shows our
fault injector, and Figure 11 shows its schematic.
Side-effects. Manipulating electrical signals to change DDR4
commands introduces side-effects. For example, changing a
signal known as ACT makes all DDR4 commands decode
as row activate (ACT) commands. In this case, a DIMM
becomes inaccessible because it receives only ACTs no matter
what command the memory controller is issuing. Table II
(reproduced from Wikipedia [113]) shows the encoding of
DDR4 commands.
Instead, we need to control these side-effects to leave the
DIMM in a responsive state; otherwise, we cannot mount a
Rowhammer attack. The DIMM must continue to receive row
activates, row reads (or writes), and row precharges.
Overcoming the side-effects. Our fault injector changes the
A14 signal from high to low and turns REF commands into a
different DDR command, known as mode register (MR0) [61]
with a null payload. Although this new command affects
the DIMM’s configuration, the DIMM continues to serve all
incoming commands. We designed our fault injector to trigger
memory recalibration and thus reset the DIMM’s configuration
back to its original settings.
Manipulating the A14 signal has an additional side-effect: it
changes a read into a write command (see [113]). To overcome
this side-effect, our Rowhammer attack instruction sequence
uses stores rather than loads. Fortunately, manipulating the
A14 signal does not affect the row activations and precharges
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needed to mount a Rowhammer attack.
Memory recalibration. The memory controller performs
memory recalibration upon detecting an error. One such error
is a parity check failure for DDR4 signals. On an incoming
command, the DIMM checks parity, and, if the check fails, it
alerts the memory controller through a reverse signal called
ALERTn. Upon receiving the alert, the memory controller
sends a sequence of DDR recalibration commands to the
DIMM.
We designed our fault injector to also recalibrate memory,
but only when the Rowhammer attack completes. This restores
the DIMM to its original configuration and lets us inspect
the location of the bit flips that could reverse engineer row
adjacency in the DRAM device. Memory recalibration cannot
occur during an ongoing Rowhammer attack because it creates
interference.
To recalibrate memory, our fault injector also manipulates
the ALERTn signal. During an ongoing Rowhammer attack,
it suppresses the ALERTn signal, thus preventing the memory
controller from receiving any alerts. Once the attack com-
pletes, the fault injector re-enables ALERTn while continuing
to manipulate A14 to ensure that parity checks continue to
fail. These alerts are now received by the memory controller,
which, in turn, recalibrates the DIMM.
Methodology for injecting DDR4 faults. Figure 12 shows our
hardware stack: the fault injector, the bus analyzer’s interposer,
and the DDR4 DIMM. We used an eight-step operational plan
to inject faults and mount Rowhammer to induce bit flips
capable of reverse engineering row adjacency:
1. Boot server with DDR parity check enabled and ECC
disabled.
2. Suppress ALERTn signal with DIP switches.
3. Begin Rowhammering the target DIMM.
4. Inject a fault in the A14 signal by pressing the button switch
for a fixed time interval. During this time, the DIMM receives
no REFs, and the memory controller receives no alerts.
5. Stop Rowhammering the target DIMM.
6. Re-connect ALERTn signal with DIP switches.
7. Inject a fault in the A14 signal by tapping the button. The
memory controller receives alerts from the DIMM and starts
recalibrating the DIMM.
8. Inspect the number and spatial distribution of bit flips.
B. Row Adjacency in DRAM Devices
We used the fault injector to reverse engineer the physical
row adjacency of DRAM devices mounted on DDR4 DIMMs.
We mounted Rowhammer attacks and measured the density
of bit flips across each row within a bank. This technique
correlates each row’s density of bit flips with adjacency [100],
[94], [105]. Invariably, when hammering one row for 15
seconds without refreshes, a small number of rows flip bits
at a much higher rate than all others. This indicates that these
highly affected rows are physically adjacent to the hammered
one.
We then posed the following questions:
1. Do logical addresses map linearly to internal DRAM
addresses? A linear map makes it easier to mount Rowhammer
because an attacker need not reverse engineer it. Previous work
showed that the map from physical to logical addresses is not
Figure 12: Our hardware stack from the bottom up: fault in-
jector, bus analyzer’s interposer, and DDR4 DIMM. Markings
on the DRAM chips have been redacted.
linear and discussed how non-linearity can render many of
the Rowhammer defenses much less effective than initially
thought [105].
2. Does the position of a bit within a word influence its
likelihood of being flipped? Such results would shed light
on whether some words (or some bits within a single word)
are more susceptible to Rowhammer attacks than others. For
example, most page table entries have a format in which
low-order bits control access to a page; should the low-order
bits be more susceptible than high-order, an attack changing
the access control policy to a page would be more likely to
succeed.
3. How do data patterns affect the susceptibility of bits being
flipped? We examined the direction in which bits flip (0-to-1
or 1-to-0). The memory controllers in datacenter servers are
routinely configured to scramble data in DRAM by xor-ing it
with a known, random data pattern [87], [43]. This means that
the proportion of 0s to 1s in DRAM is 50-50.
4. Do DIMMs sourced from different vendors have different
characteristics? We examined whether or not the map and
the rate at which bits flip are consistent across DIMMs from
different vendors.
Methodology. We performed all experiments by suppressing
REFs for 15 seconds at room temperature. We disabled data
scrambling and wrote a specific data pattern across the entire
bank except for the hammered row. We wrote the complement
of the data pattern in the hammered row, a strategy used by
previous work [62]. We experimented with four different data
patterns that vary the locations and ratios of bits set to 1 vs.
bits set to 0. The four patterns are: all 1s, 0xB6DB6DB...
(corresponding to two-thirds 1s), 0x492492... (corresponding
to one-third 1s), and all 0s. Unless marked otherwise, the
results we present use a pattern of all 1s.
When testing DRAM, a double-sided Rowhammer attack
(i.e., two aggressor rows) is better than single-sided (i.e.,
one aggressor row). However, when injecting faults, both
types of Rowhammer attack flip bits because the DIMM does
not refresh for 15 seconds. When reverse engineering row
adjacency, single-sided Rowhammer is simpler because the
adjacency of a flipped bit is unambiguous – it is due to
a single aggressor. Reverse engineering row adjacency with
double-sided Rowhammer leads to an attribution challenge –
is the flipped bit adjacent to aggressor #1 or aggressor #2? The
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Figure 13: Number of bit flips per row when suppressing REFs
for 15 sec in the absence of Rowhammer, for a representative
set of rows.
results in this section are based on using a single aggressor
row, similar to mounting a single-sided Rowhammer attack.
Our results show no differences between the DIMMs from
the same memory vendor. Most results are similar across
DIMMs supplied by different vendors; in these cases, we
present the results from a single vendor (referred to as vendor
#1). However, we note different vendors in the text when
results differ across vendors.
We verified that our fault injector suppresses refreshes on
all three Intel server architectures. We also reverse engineered
portions of the row adjacency maps of three DIMMs (one from
each vendor) on both Broadwell and Skylake and checked that
the results are identical on both platforms. On Cascade Lake,
we reverse engineered only one DIMM, with identical results
to Broadwell and Skylake. The data shown in the remainder
of this section was gathered on the Skylake platform.
Results. We started with a baseline experiment in which
we suppressed REFs for 15 seconds without any additional
memory workload. Our goal was to determine the rate of bit
flips due solely to suppressing REFs. These bit flips are not
correlated with physical row adjacency. If we observed many
such bit flips, combining suppressing REFs with Rowhammer
attacks would make it difficult to attribute responsibility for
the bit flips.
Fortunately, Figure 13 shows that the number of flipped
bits is low. Even after suppressing REFs for 15 seconds, the
majority of rows show no failures. Ten rows have a single
flipped bit (a row failure rate of 3.3%), and two have two
flipped bits (a row failure rate of 0.7%). No row has more than
two flipped bits. The low number of failures demonstrates that
our DRAM is resilient when not refreshed in the absence of
Rowhammer attacks.
Logical rows do not always map linearly. Figure 14a shows
the number of flipped bits per row when the aggressor was row
0x11411 (logical address). The results suggest a linear map
because most bit flips occur on rows 0x11410 and 0x11412
(the y-axis is logarithmic). Row 0x11410 has 50,274 flipped
bits (out of 65536, or 76.7%), and row 0x11412 has 50,489
(77.0%). All other rows have significantly fewer flipped bits.
However, the map is not always linear. Figure 14b shows the
results when the aggressor row address was 0x11410. While
victim row 0x11411 is adjacent (with over 77% of its flipped
bits), victim row 0x1140F, although adjacent in the logical
address space, has only 26,566 flipped bits corresponding to
40.5% of its bits. Instead, a third victim row (0x1141F) has
24,680 of its flipped bits (37.7%). These results indicate that
the aggressor row 0x11410 is adjacent to half of victim rows
Aggressor Victim #1 Victim #2 Victim #3
0x11408 0x11409 (75.7%) 0x11407 (40.0%) 0x11417 (36.7%)
0x11409 0x11408 (76.6%) 0x1140A (76.5%)
0x1140A 0x11409 (75.3%) 0x1140B (74.2%)
0x1140B 0x1140C (80.3%) 0x1140A (79.5%)
0x1140C 0x1140B (77.0%) 0x1140D (76.5%)
0x1140D 0x1140C (76.6%) 0x1140E (75.9%)
0x1140E 0x1140D (77.5%) 0x1140F (76.6%)
0x1140F 0x1140E (77.5%) 0x11410 (39.9%) 0x11400 (37.7%)
0x11410 0x11411 (77.7%) 0x1140F (40.5%) 0x1141F (37.7%)
0x11411 0x11412 (77.0%) 0x11410 (76.7%)
0x11412 0x11411 (78.1%) 0x11413 (77.2%)
0x11413 0x11414 (77.1%) 0x11412 (76.4%)
0x11414 0x11413 (74.7%) 0x11415 (74.0%)
0x11415 0x11414 (77.8%) 0x11416 (77.4%)
0x11416 0x11415 (79.1%) 0x11417 (78.3%)
0x11417 0x11416 (75.8%) 0x11418 (39.4%) 0x11408 (36.8%)
Table III: Adjacency for 16 rows consecutive in the logical
address space.
Row Adjacent Rows
0x0000 0x0001 (W) 0x000F (H) spare row/bank edge (?)
0x0001 0x0000 (W) 0x0002 (W)
0x0002 0x0001 (W) 0x0003 (W)
0x0003 0x0002 (W) 0x0004 (W)
0x0004 0x0003 (W) 0x0005 (W)
0x0005 0x0004 (W) 0x0006 (W)
0x0006 0x0005 (W) 0x0007 (W)
0x0007 0x0006 (W) 0x0008 (H) 0x07F8 (H)
0x0008 0x0009 (W) 0x0007 (H) 0x0017 (H)
Table IV: Adjacency for the first rows in the bank. (W)
represents half-row adjacency; (H) half-row.
0x1140F and 0x1141F. For brevity, we say a victim has whole-
row (or half-row) adjacency to refer to the adjacency of the
victim to the aggressor row.
Table III presents the row adjacency map inside the DRAM
device for 16 consecutive rows in the logical address space.
We conducted 16 experiments in which a different row acts as
the aggressor, and list the top two or three victim rows sorted
by the fraction of their bits that flip (shown in parentheses);
all remaining victims have fewer than 1% of their bits flip.
The data shows bimodal behavior: many rows map linearly
(whole-row adjacency), but some have each of their halves
mapped differently (half-row adjacency). Half-row adjacency
in shown in bold in Table III.
When examining different portions of the adjacency map,
we found that half-rows occur frequently but lack a specific
pattern. Table IV shows the adjacency map for the first rows of
the bank. Row 0 is half-adjacent to row F, but the remaining
half is not adjacent to any other row in the bank. Half of
row 0 is located either next to a spare row [40] or on the
physical edge of the DRAM array. Also, some rows shown in
Table IV have an adjacency pattern different from all others.
For example, row 7 is half adjacent to rows 8 and 0x07f8.
Fewer bits flip in half-rows than in whole-rows. We
characterize whether a bit’s position influences its likelihood
to be flipped. We start by grouping bit flips in a victim row by
their column addresses (a column address specifies a word). A
row has 1024 columns, and a column contains a 64-bit word.
Figure 15a shows data from a whole-row victim. Although
some words have more bit flips than others, this variation is
relatively low: more than 95% of all words have 40 to 60 bit
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Figure 14: No. of bit flips on rows with neighboring logical row numbers (y-axis is logarithmic). A row has 65,536 bits.
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Figure 15: No. of bit flips in each word of a victim row (the column address specifies the word). A word has 64 bits.
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Figure 16: No. of bit flips in a representative victim row by their bit index positions within a memory word.
flips, and a word has 47.6 bit flips on average. This result
suggests that an aggressor row affects all words in a victim
whole-row more or less equally.
Half-row victims have half the number of bit flips per word
(the remaining non-adjacent half is safe). Figure 15b shows the
number of bit flips per word found in two half-row victims.
Each word has 25 and 23 bit flips, respectively, on average
as opposed to 47.6 bit flips for words located in a whole-row.
This result suggests that an aggressor row affects fewer bits
per word in victim half-rows than victim whole-rows.
All bits are equally susceptible for whole-row, but not
for half-row, adjacency. We further investigated whether the
position of a bit in a word affects its likelihood of being
flipped? For this, we re-plotted the data from Figure 15 by
grouping bits by their bit position rather than their column
address. A row has 1024 bits in each bit position. Bit positions
are indexed 0 to 63 from the least to the most significant bit.
Figure 16a shows the results of a whole-row victim. As
before, an aggressor row affects all bits in a victim whole-row
equally. Figure 16b shows the results for two half-row victims.
Surprisingly, the sets of bit positions are disjoint. One of the
half-row victims has bit flips in positions 0 through 31 only,
whereas the other has bit flips in positions 32 through 63.
These results indicate that the position of a bit determines its
likelihood of being flipped in half-rows only. In a victim half-
row, either the most significant (63-32) or the least significant
(31-0) bits are flipped, depending on memory geometry. For
little endian systems (such as ours), the region containing bit
flips will inversely map to the most or least significant bits,
respectively. For example, in big endian systems, the map
will be direct: words in row 0x1140F will have their least
significant bits flipped, while words in row 0x1141F, their
most significant. All DIMMs from all three hardware vendors
exhibited this behavior.
Most, but not all, bits flip from 1 to 0. Electromagnetic cou-
pling (considered to be a main reason for Rowhammer [69])
drains capacitors faster than normal. Memory encodings can
represent a charged capacitor as either a 1 or a 0, making the
data pattern another factor in a bit’s susceptibility to be flipped.
Cells that encode data value 1 as a charge are called true-cells,
while anti-cells encode data value 0 as a charge [75].
To examine this effect, we seeded memory with four data
patterns: all 1s, two-thirds 1s (0xB6DB6D...), one-third 1s
(0x492492...), and all 0s. Figure 17 shows the number of bit
flips in a victim row for different data patterns. This number
is directly proportional to the number of bits seeded with a
value of 1: 79.7% for all 1s, 57% for two-thirds 1s, 29.9% for
one-third 1s, and 3.8% for all 0s. While bits can flip in both
directions, most bit flips were seeded with a value of 1.
DIMMs from vendors #2 and #3 have fewer bit flips. We
repeated the experiments with DIMMs sourced from the other
two hardware vendors. Vendor #2 has fewer bit flips per row
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Figure 17: Number of bit flips in a representative row for
four different data patterns: all 1s (0xFFF...), two-third 1s
(0xB6DB6D...), one-third 1s (0x492492...), all 0s (0x000...).
than vendor #1. Figure 18 shows the number of bit flips for
vendor #2 for the same aggressor rows as before: 0x11410
and 0x11411. When the aggressor row is 0x11410, the whole-
row victim (0x11411) has only 42.1% of its bits flipped, while
the half-row victims (0x11409 and 0x11413) have 25.9% and
21% of their bits flipped, respectively.
Further, the map differs from one vendor to another. Ven-
dor #1’s row 0x11411 has two rows wholly adjacent, rows
0x11410 and 0x11412 (Figure 14). Instead, for vendor #2,
this row has whole-row adjacency with row 0x11410 but only
half-row with row 0x11412 and the other half with 0x11408.
Figure 19 shows that vendor #3 has far fewer bit flips than
both other vendors. When the aggressor is row # 0x11410,
the adjacent rows have only about 0.08% of their bits flipped
(roughly two orders of magnitude fewer flips than vendor #1).
When the aggressor is row # 0x11411, the adjacent rows have
about 3% of their bits flipped (one order of magnitude fewer
flips than vendor #1).
To understand whether the lower rate of bit flips for vendors
#2 and #3 can be attributed to different encoding schemes, we
repeated these experiments with a data pattern of all 0s. We
found that even fewer bits flip. For all three vendors, most bits
in victim rows flip when seeded with a value of 1.
In order to pinpoint the reasons why vendor #2 and #3’s
DIMMs were more resilient than vendor #1’s DIMMs, we
decoded the part numbers of each DIMM from each vendor,
checking for differences in lithography. We found that each
vendor used a different lithography process; vendor #1’s
process had the highest density, vendor #2 had lower density,
and vendor #3 had the lowest one. These results suggest
that increasing DRAM density increases the probability of
flipping bits in a Rowhammer attack. Previous work also found
different rates of bit flips in different DIMMs [69], [105].
VI. OPERATIONAL ASPECTS OF DRAM TESTING
METHODOLOGY
Our DRAM testing methodology uses two clflushopt in-
structions in a loop to hammer DRAM. For each row to test,
we use address maps to identify adjacent rows. We seed the
aggressor row with 0s and the victims with 1s. If the tested
row has two adjacent full-rows, we find two virtual addresses
that map to each of these rows, to seed our two cache line
flush instructions. For each row, we run the test for 128ms,
corresponding to twice the duration of a refresh interval. In this
way, we ensure that our tests span at least one entire refresh
interval. At the end of the test, we check whether the tested
row has any of its bits flipped to 0. When any adjacent row
is a half-row, we perform the experiment multiple times, once
for each half-row.
Testing a single bank of our server-class DIMMs using this
methodology takes 11 hours and 36 minutes. Because our
DIMMs have 16 banks, testing an entire DIMM would take
about a week. We adopted several optimizations to better scale
our methodology. First, we test several banks in parallel; we
concurrently test eight different banks on the same DIMM with
little interference. Second, rather than testing a row followed
by checking it for bit flips, we batch multiple tests back-to-
back and follow them with a single check at the end. This
reduces the time needed for the checking step. With these
optimizations in place, our methodology can test an entire
DIMM in less than one day. In the future, we plan to further
scale up our methodology to simultaneously test multiple
DIMMs by ensuring the tested DIMMs share no channels.
In small-scale experiments with our six server-class
DIMMs, we found it very difficult to flip bits using our
testing methodology. At normal DRAM refresh rates (with
ECC disabled), we observed only two bit flips on a single
DIMM. Despite many additional tests with the same aggressor
rows, we were unable to reproduce these bit flips. However,
at lower refresh rates, the same DIMM showed hundreds of
bit flips (when we increased the refresh interval by a factor of
3.5x). We were unable to produce bit flips in our other DIMMs
even with a reduced refresh rate.
Our methodology has several limitations we plan to address
in future work.
Handling TRR. Some DDR4 DRAM claims it supports
Targeted Row Refresh (TRR) [61], a Rowhammer defense in
which the DIMM aggressively refreshes rows under attack.
However, researchers have mounted successful Rowhammer
attacks to such memory [77], [94], [2], [3], [18]; in these
cases, it is unclear whether TRR is ineffective or not yet
enabled. Because the details of TRR implementations remain
unknown, we designed our methodology to use the instruction
sequence with the highest rate of row activations. If TRR im-
plementations are reverse engineered, our methodology could
be adapted to use an instruction sequence that bypasses TRR
defenses while maximizing the row activation rate.
Scaling limitations. Unfortunately, our methodology for
reverse engineering row adjacency in a DIMM requires the
placement of a hardware fault injector between a DIMM and
its slot. This manual step creates too much overhead and
disruption to be performed at large scale. Instead, in practice,
we make a simplifying assumption: similar DIMMs sourced
from the same vendor have the same row adjacency map.
Another limitation stems from the choice of using the A14
bit in our current fault injector design (described in Section V).
For ACT commands, this bit encodes a row address. Currently,
our reverse engineering methodology cannot use a row whose
address has a high bit in A14. Our methodology therefore
tests only half the rows in a bank (those with a value of ’0’
for A14). We are currently investigating a more sophisticated
fault injector design that can also work with a high bit in A14.
On generalizing our methodology. All our experiments
were performed on Intel-based architectures of a cloud
provider’s compute nodes. However, cloud providers can use
servers based on other types of architectures, such as AMD
or ARM. Furthermore, in the cloud, DRAM can be found in
many places other than compute nodes, such as storage nodes,
network cards, switches, middleboxes, and so on. Although
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Figure 18: No. of bit flips on rows with neighboring logical row numbers for vendor #2.
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Figure 19: No. of bit flips on rows with neighboring logical row numbers for vendor #3.
our results do not directly transfer to other types of architec-
tures or cloud equipment, we believe that our methodology
can be used directly or adapted to create worst-case testing
conditions.
Additional variables. Our methodology hammers one row
for 128ms, a period of time equal to two refresh intervals.
This is the minimal time interval to ensure that testing one
row spans at least one entire refresh interval from start to end.
A more thorough methodology would determine the duration
needed to test a row to declare it safe.
In all our experiments, the data values stored in the aggres-
sor rows are the complement of the values stored in the rest
of the bank, a strategy inspired by previous work [18]. We
have not experimented with storing different data values in
the aggressor row.
VII. RELATED WORK
Many prior works build upon the Rowhammer phe-
nomenon [88], [69], [89] for both attacks [32], [101], [97],
[110], [37], [25], [36], [106], [83], [114], [13], [96], [11],
[59], [95], [2], [105], [94], [16], [18], [10], [118], [12], [22],
[62], [76] and defenses [4], [39], [82], [24], [5], [67], [102],
[14], [56], [104], [29], [111], [80], [15], [7], [6], [9], [8], [34],
[74], [58], [30], [63], [73], [99], [112]. Few of these works
provide insight into the difficulty behind mounting an attack on
a real system, and none develop a methodology for thoroughly
profiling a DIMM for Rowhammer vulnerability. We discuss
the most closely related works to ours. A detailed survey of a
very large number of Rowhammer related works can be found
in [89].
Rowhammer Testing Platforms. Kim et al. [69] first stud-
ied the Rowhammer disturbance effect on DDR3 using a cus-
tom FPGA-based memory controller [38], [103] that directly
interfaces with and sends DDR3 commands to DRAM devices.
They [69] also study Rowhammer on Intel and AMD plat-
forms. [23] implements an OS for testing memory devices on
Raspberry Pi platforms. Drammer [110], [21], [20], an open-
source Android app, tests mobile devices for Rowhammer
and gathers data from users to characterize how widespread
Rowhammer is. MemTest86 [93], software that tests DRAM
for many types of reliability issues, added Rowhammer testing.
[116] presents a methodology for injecting a Rowhammer
attack that is largely complementary to ours because it focuses
on ways to place a victim page into a vulnerable memory
location. [116] also emulates Rowhammer failures and evalu-
ates them by injecting errors into an OS kernel. While these
previous works provide insight into studying Rowhammer in
real DRAM devices, they either do not create worst-case
testing conditions or do not work in end-to-end systems like
our cloud servers.
Physical Row Adjacency. Other works attempt to reverse
engineer the DRAM address mapping with various techniques,
such as side-channels [94], [64], software fault injection [105],
or hardware fault injection [18], [53]. Section III-C discusses
their shortcomings in depth.
A number of other works [115], [117], [91], [98] sidestep
the address translation issue and study the Rowhammer phe-
nomenon directly at the circuit level with simulations. Unfor-
tunately, these works do not allow us to study Rowhammer
characteristics on real devices.
Optimal Rowhammer Access Pattern. Previous works
used a plethora of instruction sequences to test for Rowham-
mer [69], [32], [114], [13], [96], [11], [37], [94], [97], [110],
[77], [59], [2], [35], [36], [105]. These works measure an
instruction sequence’s efficiency by quantifying the number of
Rowhammer failures it induces on a set of DIMMs. In contrast,
our work (1) characterizes an instruction sequence’s rate of
ACTs, (2) describes and evaluates the factors that prevent
the sequence from achieving the optimal ACT rate, and (3)
proposes a new instruction sequence that is near-optimal on
Skylake, a platform commonly used in modern cloud servers.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents an end-to-end methodology for rig-
orously evaluating the susceptibility of cloud servers to
Rowhammer attacks. Our methodology creates worst-case
DRAM testing conditions by overcoming two main challenges:
(1) generating the highest rate of row activation commands
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to DRAM, and (2) testing rows whose cells are physically
adjacent inside a DRAM device. Cloud providers can adapt our
techniques to test their infrastructure in practice and determine
whether a Rowhammer attack can cause DRAM bits to flip.
Applying our methodology to multiple generations of
servers from a major cloud provider produced noteworthy
results. First, none of the instruction sequences used in
previous work to mount Rowhammer attacks create near-
optimal row activation rates. Second, we constructed a new
instruction sequence that generates a near-optimal rate of row
activations on Skylake and Cascade Lake. This instruction
sequence leverages microarchitectural side-effects to create
row activations and uses no explicit memory accesses. Third,
we designed and implemented a fault injector capable of
reverse engineering row adjacency inside any DRAM device
on a DIMM. Finally, we used our fault injector to reverse
engineer the physical adjacency of DIMMs sourced from three
major DRAM vendors. Our results show that logical rows do
not always map linearly inside DRAM devices.
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